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FLAGG BROTHERS, INC. V. BROOKS

THE PUBLIC FUNCTION DOCTRINE
IN RETREAT
INTRODUCTION
Since the Civil Rights Cases,' it has been clear that the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment do not apply to
purely private conduct, rather, they apply only to conduct attributable to a state. Thus, in order to subject seemingly private activity to the restraints of the fourteenth amendment, courts have
had to determine whether the challenged conduct constituted
"state action."' 2

The Supreme Court has indicated that the "under color of
state law" provision of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
18713 and the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment are equivalent. 4 Claims brought under this statute and its
jurisdictional counterpart5 have resulted in the Court's leading
decisions on the issue of what private activity constitutes state
action.6 However, the Court has had great difficulty in drawing a
1. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2. E.g. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see text
accompanying notes 73-74 infra.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides:
Every Person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
4. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 n.7 (1970); United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .(3) To redress

the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States....
6. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (due process attack on state authorized prejudgment sale of encumbered goods by warehousemen); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (due
process attack on termination practices of privately owned utility); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (equal protection attack on
racially discriminatory practices of restaurant leasing space in a state
owned building; state action found).
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7
definitive line between state and private action. State action
has readily been found where public officials have lent the8
weight of their offices to the actions of private individuals.
However, when public officials have not provided the imprimatur of state involvement in private transactions, the Court has
9
developed three primary approaches to find state action.

The "public function" doctrine subjects certain activities to
the protections of the fourteenth amendment regardless of state
10
involvement. Private operation of a company owned town, ad12
and
ministration of a party primary," pre-primary elections
13
functions
public
deemed
been
all
management of a park have
subject to constitutional regulation without a finding of any
state participation in the challenged activities. In a recent case
involving a public utility company's termination of service, the
Court explained that for an activity engaged in by a private
party to be found to be a "public function," "powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State" must be exercised by that pri-

vate party.

14

The second area where state action has been found occurs
when a state has either "authorized or encouraged" a certain
7. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the
Court noted that devising a formula for determining state action in nonobvious situations was impossible. The Court advocated a case by case analysis
"by sifting facts and weighing circumstances" to determine whether state
action exists. Id. at 722. This principle was affirmed in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); accord, Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONsTrrurIONAL LAw, ch. 14 (1978).
8. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)
(writ of garnishment issued by state officer so authorized or court clerk on
affidavit of plaintiff or his attorney, containing only conclusory allegations);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (private party obtained prejudgment
writ of replevin through summary ex parte application to a court clerk by
posting double value bond; sheriff then required to execute writ by seizing
the property); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (clerk of
the court issues summons at the request of creditor's lawyer and later
serves garnishee, setting in motion the machinery whereby wages are frozen).
9. Glennon &Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the FourteenthAmendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 221 [hereinafter cited
as Glennon & Nowak].
10. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
11. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
12. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); see also Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (state political party convention was held subject to constitutional regulation).
13. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978) (stating that Evans had been decided
upon a "finding of ordinary state action under extraordinary circumstances").
14. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).

Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks
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private activity. 15 In Reitman v. Mulkey, 16 the case defining this
doctrine, the Supreme Court held that a state constitutional
amendment, prohibiting the legislature from restricting an individual's right to refuse to sell or lease real property as he chose,
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 17 The Court found that the amendment had been pushed
through in response to the Unruh 18 and Rumford Acts, 19 which
had prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of any
private dwelling. 20 In so finding, the Court reasoned that the
amendment "would encourage and significantly involve the
State in private racial discrimination."'2 1 However, in subse22
quent decisions the Court has declined to expand Reitman.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority23 established the
third primary approach of finding state action-the "symbiotic
relationship" doctrine. 24 In Burton, a privately owned restaurant that leased space in a publicly owned and operated building
refused to serve blacks. The Court closely examined and
weighed the facts before concluding that Delaware had been a
"joint participant" in the restaurant's operation. 25 The rendering of mutual benefits between a private actor and the state will
support a finding that a "symbiotic relationship" exists. This re26
lationship is characterized as state action.
The concept of state action has been developed primarily in
15. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 373.
18. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51-52 (West 1959).
19. CAL. Health & Safety CODE § 35700-35744 (West 1963) (the Rumford
Fair Housing Act has been amended since 1963, and its present version may
be found in the West supplemental pocket part under the above same citation).

20. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 374 (1967).
21. Id. at 381.

22. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (state statute
authorizing a warehouseman's prejudgment sale of encumbered goods held

not to constitute state action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 17177 (1972) (regulatory scheme enforced by state liquor board does not sufficiently involve state to constitute state action); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 148, 167 (1970) (state statute allowing freedom of choice with
whom to do business not enough for finding of state action; likewise for local custom unless accompanied by persistent practices of local officials).
See generally Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's

Proposition14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Black, "State
Action"].

23. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
24. Both Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974),
and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1972) cited Burton as
defining the state action theory of symbiotic relationships.
25. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961).
26. Id.;

Melara

v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1976).
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the area of racial discrimination where the basis of the claim has
been a denial of equal protection. 27 However, where equal protection is not the basis of the claim and racial discrimination is
not involved, the courts will more narrowly construe the state
28
action concept.
In recent years there has been a steady increase in due
30
Of the three
process 29 attacks on creditors' self-help remedies.
primary approaches to a finding of state action the "public function" and "authorized and encouraged" doctrines have
predominated, 3 1 with the public function approach being the

more successful.

32

27. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (held private club's racially discriminatory practices not state action solely because
of state granting club a liquor license); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970) (local custom of racial discrimination by restaurants not state action unless accompanied by persistent practices of state officials); Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state constitutional amendment allowing persons to decline to rent or sell to whomever they choose was state action);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant leasing
space in state owned and operated building refused to serve blacks; held
state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants was held state action). See, e.g., Burke & Reber, State
Action, CongressionalPower and Creditor'sRights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S.CAL.L. REV. 1003, 1010 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Burke & Reber]; Black, "State Action", supra note 19, at 70-71. See generally Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer.Notesfor a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 473 (1962).
28. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 634-35 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) (action brought against charitable foundation alleging racial discrimination); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324, 333 n.24 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (debtor's
vehicles repossessed without warning, brought action alleging violation of
due process under the fourteenth amendment). Accord, Burke & Reber,
supra note 25, at 1034-41. See generally Note, State Action. Theoriesfor Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
656, 658 (1974).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... "
30. Burke & Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditor's
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3
(1973).
31. This is true because the state usually does not derive any benefit
from aiding the creditor and thus a symbiotic relationship can not be found.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the state was
receiving rental payments from a restaurant tenant and a symbiotic relationship was held to exist. The Court has cited Burton as defining the doctrine of symbiotic relationships on numerous. occasions. E.g., Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1972).
32. The "authorized and encouraged" rationale of Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), has been widely criticized by commentators who have
suggested that this rationale would only be applicable in cases involving
racial discrimination. See Black, "State Action", supra note 22, at 81-82;
Burke & Reber, supra note 27, at 1078-80. Consequently, some courts have
balked at the idea of using this doctrine to find state action in non-racial
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Resolution of the presence of state action precedes 33 any determination of the constitutional challenge.3 4 Regardless of the
merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim, a debtor's suit will be
dismissed if the court finds that the challenged activity does not
constitute state action.3 5 Only when a creditor's conduct is
termed state action are prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard constitutionally required by due process prior to depriv36
ing a debtor of his property.
Among the creditor's self-help remedies that have been
challenged as denying procedural due process are innkeeper's
and landlord's liens, 37 repossessions under sections 9-503 and 9504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 repairman's and garagecases. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 553 F.2d 764, 770-71 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds,436 U.S. 149 (1978). See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R. Fed. 431,
§§ 1-5 (1977).
33. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 553 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804
(9th Cir. 1976).
35. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In Jackson,
the Court did not reach the due process question because it initially determined that the furnishing of utility services was neither a state function nor
a municipal duty. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) (dismissed Brooks' due process claim without reaching the substantive merits, when determined that Flagg's action was purely private).
36. See generally Burke & Reber, supra note 27; Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Williams, The Twilight of State
Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347 (1963).
37. Held to be action under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) when a private person acted pursuant to a state statute;
e.g., Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Hall v. Garson, 430
F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138
(S.D. Fla. 1975); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Dielen v.
Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F.
Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Held not to be action under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) when a private person acted pursuant to a state statute;
e.g., Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975);
Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971), affd on other
grounds, 450 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. Held to be action under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) when a private person acted pursuant to U.C.C. §§ 9-503
and 9-504; e.g., Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich.
1974), rev'd mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) (9-503); Boland v. Essex
County Bank & Trust, 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973) (9-503, 9-504, and
state's installment sales laws).
Held not to be action under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) when a private person acted pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-503
and 9-504; e.g., Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974) (9-503);
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974) (9-503); Brantley v. Union Bank
& Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974) (9503, 9-504); Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974) (9-503); Nowlin v.
Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974) (9-503, 9-504), cert.
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man's liens, 39 and execution on a warehouseman's lien pursuant
to section 7-210.4 0 The decisions have been inconsistent and virtually impossible to reconcile 41 because the lower courts have
been forced to apply principles developed by the Supreme
42
Court under different circumstances.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks43 to resolve the conflict regarding the constitutionality of statutory, private creditor self-help remedies in
which state officials had not participated. The specific issue in
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th
Cir. 1974) (9-503, 9-504); Gibbs v. Titleman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974) (9-503, 9-504 and Penn. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1974) (9-503, 9-504), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Johnson v. Associates
Fin. Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. IlM. 1973) (9-503, 9-504); Kinch v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (9-503); Pease v. Havelock
Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972) (9-503, 9-504); Kirksey v. Theilig,
351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972) (9-503, 9-504 and provisions of Colorado's
motor vehicle laws); Green v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D.
Va. 1972) (9-503); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.
1971) (9-503).
39. Held to be action under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) when a private person acted pursuant to a state statute;
e.g., Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1976) (garageman's
lien); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (garageman's
lien); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973) (repairman's lien, implicit state action).
Held not to be action under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) when a private person acted pursuant to a state statute;
e.g. Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 386 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1974) (repairman's lien);
Phillips v. Money, 503 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
40. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977) (state action
found), rev'd, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Cox Bakeries of N.D. v. Timm Moving &
Storage, Inc., 554 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (state action found); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976) (no state action); Magro v. Lentini Bros.
Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (the court did not
consider the state action question, assumed state action existed and found
no denial of fourteenth amendment rights. The court erred in this approach
because the state action issue must be resolved before reaching the constitutional challenge, see note 32 and accompanying text supra). U.C.C. § 7210. The challenged statute in Flagg provides in pertinent part:
§ 7-210. Enforcement of Warehouseman'sLien
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a warehouseman's lien may
be enforced by public or private sale of the goods in bloc or in parcels,
at any time or place and on any terms which are commercially reasonable, after notifying all persons known to claim an interest in the goods.
(2) A warehouseman's lien on goods other than goods stored by a
merchant in the course of his business may be enforced only as follows....
N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (62% McKinney 1964) (The omitted portions of the statute deal primarily with the notice which a warehouseman must give the
owner of encumbered goods before selling them.).
41. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra. See generally Annot.,
32 A.L.R. Fed. 431, §§ 12-20 (1977).
42. Burke & Reber, supra note 27, at 1040-41.
43. Cert. granted, 434 U.S. 817 (1977).
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Flagg was whether a state statute which authorized a private
creditor to permanently deprive a debtor of his property without
his consent must meet the requirements of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
FACTS AND DISTICT COURT RULING

In 1973, Shirley Herriot Brooks was evicted from her apartment building by the City Marshall of Mount Vernon, New York.
Believing she had no choice, Ms. Brooks agreed to store her possessions with Flagg Brothers, Inc.4 A dispute arose over storage charges and Ms. Brooks was informed that unless she paid
her account, her goods would be sold pursuant to New York
Commercial Code section 7-210(2). 45 She then brought a class
action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. 1343(3), seeking damages, injunctive relief, and a
declaration that section 7-210(2) violated her due process rights
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The district court found that Flagg Brothers' proposed sale
of Ms. Brooks' goods pursuant to section 7-210(2) would not con46
stitute state action and dismissed the action on two grounds.
First, Ms. Brooks had failed to show sufficient state involvement
to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court under section 1343(3). Second, plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which
47
relief could be granted under section 1983.
44. The city marshall removed Ms. Brooks and her possessions from her
apartment. When Ms. Brooks stated that she wished to call someone to
store her goods, the marshall informed her that she could not do this and
that the man accompanying the marshall, defendant Henry Flagg, president

of defendant Flagg Bros., Inc., would store her furniture. 553 F.2d 764, 766-67
(1977). The city marshall had originally been joined as a defendant but was
let out of the case for some unexplained reason. Had the plaintiff chosen to
keep the marshall in the case she almost certainly would have prevailed in
satisfying the state action requirement. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975).
.45. See note 40 supra.
46. 404 F. Supp. 1059, 1066-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
47. Id. at 1061. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit,
stated that it agreed with the district court for dismissing the action for
want of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1343(3). 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The
Court then acknowledged that the district court had also dismissed the action because the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983
and proceeded to examine the adequacy of respondents' claim for relief
under § 1983. In this manner the Court apparently overlooked the error of
the district court's dismissal. State action is a necessary element of both
§ 1343(3) and § 1983. See notes 3, 5 supra. However, only a "substantial"
allegation of state action is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on a federal district court under § 1343(3), Hoggans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-39 (1974); whereas a finding of state action is a necessary element of a
valid claim for relief under § 1983. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345 (1974). The district court appears to have based its dismissal of
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THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

On appeal, Ms. Brooks asserted that Flagg Brothers' proposed conduct would constitute state action on either of two
grounds: the state had delegated a uniquely governmental
power, and, by enacting section 7-210, New York had authorized
and encouraged Flagg Brothers' proposed action. The Second

Circuit agreed with Ms. Brooks' first contention that New York
had delegated an essentially public function, basing its decision
upon an historical analysis of warehousemen's remedies and
the practical impact of the change in the common law caused by
the enactment of section 7-210.48 The court acknowledged that
the Supreme Court had not addressed the particular question of
whether a state's delegation of authority to private creditors
constituted state action, and relied upon the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.,49 a case involving a due process challenge of the termination practices of a privately owned utility company. 50
THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Majority Opinion
The Court announced that the only issue involved was
whether Flagg Brothers' proposed action, taken pursuant to section 7-210(2), was fairly attributal to the State of New York. In
Brooks' action, for jurisdictional grounds, upon a finding that Flagg's proposed conduct would not actually constitute state action. 404 F. Supp. 1059
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Having once assumed jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of Brooks' § 1983 claim, the district court should not have dismissed
the action on jurisdictional grounds as the Supreme Court made clear in
Hoggans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538-542 (1974):
§§ 1343(3) and 1983 unquestionably authorized federal courts to entertain suits to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights. It is also plain that the complaint formally alleged such
a deprivation. The District Court's jurisdiction, a matter of threshold
determination, turned on whether the question was too insubstantial
for consideration. "Jurisdiction ... is not defeated as respondents
seem to contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to
state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For
it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls
for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief
could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be
decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over
the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of
jurisdiction". [citation omitted]
48. 553 F.2d 764, 770-73 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
50. 553 F.2d 764, 770-73 (2d Cir. 1977).
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deciding that it was not, the Court rejected both the "public
function" and the "authorized and encouraged" arguments advanced by Ms. Brooks.
The Public Function Doctrine
In dealing with Ms. Brooks' "primary contention . .. that
New York ... [had] delegated to Flagg Brothers a power 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the State', 5 1 the Supreme Court
relied heavily upon the language of Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co. 52 in explaining that "[wihile many functions have
been traditionally performed by governments, very few have
been 'exclusively reserved to the State'. 53a The Flagg Court
made it clear that only those activities exclusively reserved to
the state could be considered public functions,54 but that a
power or activity which had been traditionallyreserved to the
state was not enough. 55 The Court specifically rejected an historical analysis of warehousemen's remedies as being of no
56
value.
The Court outlined the activities which it had deemed to be
public functions in prior decisions. Included by the Flagg Court
were: the operation and government of a company owned
town,5 7 and the administration of party primary5 8 and pre-primary elections.5 9 The Supreme Court found that running
through these cases was the "common ... feature of exclusiv60
ity" which distinguished them from the situation in Flagg.
Specifically, the elections involved in the cases above had been
the only meaningful ones held in that state, and the streets of
the company owned town had been the only ones available for
the purpose of exercising first amendment rights. Thus, the
Flagg Court found distinguishing features of "exclusivity"
under these facts. 6 1 In determining that the settlement of
51. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
52. 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). "We have, of course, found state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State."
53. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).
54. Id. at 159.
55. Id. at 160.
56. Id. at 162-63.
57. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
58. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (racially restrictive policies of
party convention held unconstitutional); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932) (racially restrictive policies of party primary election held unconstitutional).
59. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
60. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 (1978).

61. Id. at 159-60.
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debtor-creditor disputes was not a function exclusively reserved
to the state, the Flagg Court found it to be decisive that alternative means of relief had been available to Ms. Brooks. 62 The
Court therefore concluded "that the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive
'63
public function.
State Authorized and EncouragedAction
The Flagg Court dealt briefly with Ms. Brooks' second contention, namely, that New York had authorized and encouraged
Flagg Brothers' proposed conduct by enacting section 7-210. The
Court explained that a statute or regulation must do more than
simply allow a certain activity before state action will be found,
stating that recent cases had rejected the prior notion that state
acquiescence would impose fourteenth amendment restraints
on private action.64 The Flagg Court indicated that unless a
statute or regulation "compelled" private action, the resulting
transaction would not be attributable to the state. 65 Certain private action could be legislatively permitted without being subject to fourteenth amendment restraints. 66 Section 7-210 did not
require Flagg Brothers to sell Ms. Brooks' goods in order to satisfy their possessory lien; it merely allowed them to do so at
their discretion. Therefore, the Court held that New York's en67
actment of section 7-210 did not constitute state action.
62. Id. at 161-62.
63. Id. at 161. The Court cautioned, however, that it was not asserting
that dispute resolution between debtors and creditors was wholly beyond
Constitutional constraint. Id. at 173 n.12.
64. Id. at 164, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
65. 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978).
66. Id. The Court relied upon Evans v. Abney, 398 U.S. 435 (1970), to
illustrate this principle. In Evans, realty was allowed to revert to the settlor's heirs after it was determined that the land could not be used for a
racially restricted park as the settlor had directed. The Georgia court, in

allowing the property to revert, had refused to apply cy-pres to delete certain terms of the trust. Rather, they recognized that state law allowed a
settlor to set trust terms and conditions as he saw fit. The Supreme Court
affirmed, finding no state action.
67. 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978). Justice Rehnquist felt that since all property
rights are determined by state law,
[i] t would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous
cases, the notion of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment to
hold that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State,
whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even
though no state officials or state process were ever involved in enforcing

that body of law.
Id. at 160 n.10.
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The Dissent68
Justice Stevens, dissenting, disagreed with the Court's analytical approach and the standards that it had applied to Ms.
Brooks' state action arguments. Justice Stevens insisted that an
historical analysis had previously been used primarily in determining whether a state had delegated a public function, and that
the Flagg Court's standards of "exclusivity" and "compulsion,"
as applied to the "public function" and "authorized and encouraged" doctrines respectively, were inflexible and therefore
69
unworkable.
Acknowledging that there was little support for the proposition that statutory authorization alone was sufficient to establish
state action, Justice Stevens found that it was not necessary to
consider this argument 70 because, he contended, New York had
delegated a public function to Flagg Brothers by enacting section 7-210. In support of this conclusion, Justice Stevens cited
the line of cases beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,71 which had invalidated certain state statutes authorizing
summary creditor remedies. He disagreed with the majority's
distinction of these cases on the basis of official state involvement. Justice Stevens argued that in these cases the Court had
looked to the nature of the powers delegated, and not to the ministerial acts of minor state officials, in determining that these
statutes had granted state authority to the private creditors. He
therefore thought it relevant that no state officials had participated in Flagg because a warehouseman's power under section
72
7-210 was broader than that authorized in these previous cases.
Consequently, Justice Stevens felt that the Flagg Court's decision was "fundamentally inconsistent with, if not foreclosed by"
68. Justice Marshall wrote a short dissent, 436 U.S. 149, 166-68 (1978),
expressing the sentiment that the Court was showing "indifference to the

realities of life for the poor." He also felt that the Court should have given

more weight to an historical analysis of warehousemen's remedies at

common law in determining whether New York's delegation of power
constituted a public function. However, Justice Marshall also joined Mr.
Justice Stevens' more substantial dissent and for that reason I consider
directly only the latter.
69. Id. at 167-68.
70. Id. at 171. Justice Stevens stated: "While members of this Court
have suggested that statutory authorization alone may be sufficient to establish state action, it is not necessary to rely on those suggestions in this
case because New York has authorized the warehouseman to perform what
is clearly a state function."
71. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment procedure held unconstitutional).
The other cases he cited are North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment procedure held unconstitutional); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S., 67 (1972) (replevin procedure held unconstitutional).
72. 436 U.S. 149, 176 (1978).
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these prior decisions.

73

ANALYSIS

Ms. Brooks' Authorized and EncouragedArgument
The Court's summary consideration and dismissal of Ms.
Brooks' contention that Flagg Brothers' action was attributable
to the State, because New York had "authorized and encouraged" it by enacting section 7-210, was correct. Ms. Brooks
relied upon the language of Reitman v. Mulkey 74 in phrasing her
allegation. However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions had
rejected the Reitman rationale that legislative acquiescence
would impose fourteenth amendment restraints on private ac75
tion.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,76 the Court was
faced with the same contention in considering whether the legislatively approved termination practices of a public utility company constituted state action. In deciding that the company's
action was private and therefore not subject to the restraints of
the fourteenth amendment, the Court found it decisive that the
State "ha[d] not put its own weight on the side of the proposed
practice by ordering it. '' 77 The Flagg Court's language and reasoning closely paralleled that of Jackson.
Numerous lower court decisions have rejected the contention that the "authorization and encouragement" rationale of
Reitman represents a sufficient basis for finding state action in
private creditor remedy cases.78 Even the Second Circuit, while
deciding that state action was present in Flagg, concluded that
the reasoning of Reitman was an inappropriate basis for finding
79
state action.
The Supreme Court's holding in Flagg that private action
will not be attributable to the state unless a statute or regulation
73. Id. at 169.

74. 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
75. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
(1978) ("where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmit a practice initiated by
the utility and approved by the commission into 'state action'"). See also
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 458 (1970) (trust property allowed to revert in
accordance with state law when racially restrictive purposes for the property were frustrated; held not state action).
76. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
77. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
78. E.g., Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 155-56 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201,
203 n.4 (lst Cir. 1975); Bond v. Dentzler, 494 F.2d 302, 309-310 (2d Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974).
79. See 553 F.2d 764, 770-71 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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compels that action, is well supported by case law.80 Commentators have suggested that the "authorized and encouraged" rationale of Reitman would only be applicable in cases involving
racial discrimination.8 1 The Flagg Court does not address this
possibility but only makes it clear that in the commercial arena,
legislative authorization and encouragement of private activities
82
will not constitute state action.
Ms. Brooks' Public Function Argument
The public function doctrine was never envisioned as a
means to protect constitutional rights in all instances of state
delegation of authority.8 3 The focus of inquiry in determining
whether an activity was a public function, and therefore subject
to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment, has always centered on the nature of the activity involved.8 The standard previously used by the Court in making this determination was
whether the delegated power was one which had been traditionally reserved to the state. 85 In Flagg, the Court appears to have
adopted a new standard based upon an activity's exclusive state
nature. A careful historical analysis of the public function doctrine's evolution is necessary in order to fully evaluate the merit
of the Flagg Court's reasoning.
The public function doctrine has gone through three stages
of development. The seeds of the idea that in a modem society
certain activities must be constitutionally controlled, regardless
of who is administering them, first surfaced in Justice Harlan's
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases.86 However, it was not until
80. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
81. See Burke & Reber, supra note 27, at 1078-80; Black, "State Action",

supra note 22, at 82-83.

82. The Flagg Court does not specifically refer to Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), in refuting its reasoning. Perhaps this is because the
Court wishes to preserve the rationale of Reitman, should it be needed

later.
83. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-54 (1974). See Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-508 (1946); Smith v.

A1lwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-65 (1944).
84. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (administration of a
municipal park); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (operation of a company owned town); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (administration of
primary elections).

85. See note 84 supra.
86. 109 U.S. 3, 37-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan reasoned that certain activities are so inately concerned with the public interest that they should be subject to Congressional legislation regardless of
who administered these activities.
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thirty years later, in 1927,87 that the Supreme Court adopted this
concept in the line of cases concerning private party primary
88
election procedures in Texas.
In these White Primary Cases,89 the Court looked to the
spirit and purpose of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
to invalidate the racially exclusionary practices of various private Texas Democratic organizations. 90 The fact that elections
had always been traditionally associated with state sovereignty
was considered of great importance by the Court in reaching its
decisions. The Court reasoned that the manifest purposes of
these amendments should not be frustrated by the fact that private persons, rather than state officials, were responsible for the
questioned practices.9 1
In 1946, the Court was again presented with a problem involving the alleged abuse of a sovereign function by a private
party. In Marsh v. Alabama,92 the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned the entire town of Chickasaw, Alabama. Gulf had
refused to allow Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute leaflets in the
town's streets. A member of the group did so anyway and was
arrested and convicted under the state criminal trespass law. In
reversing the defendant's conviction and invalidating Gulf's restrictive practices, the Court reasoned that "[s] ince these facilities ...
[were] built.and operated primarily to benefit the
public and since their operation ... [was] essentially a public
function" the guarantees of the first and fourteenth amend93
ments were applicable.
The seeds of the public function doctrine were planted in
the White Primary Cases and Marsh v. Alabama. However,
these cases had dealt only with elections and private government of a town, activities peculiarly related to state sovereignty.
In the second stage of the doctrine's development, uncertainty
87. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (racially exclusive prac-

tices of democratic party primary elections held unconstitutional).
88. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pre-primary election procedures held unconstitutional); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (party
convention's racially restrictive policies held unconstitutional); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (primary election procedures held unconstitu-

tional).

89. See notes 87-88 supra.
90. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (In Terry, the Court noted that
the primary election involved was the only election which had counted but
decided the case according to the spirit of the fifteenth amendment. Id. at
469-70). The Flagg Court cites Terry as defining one branch of the public
function doctrine. 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).

91. Id.
92. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
93. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
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reigned as the Court groped for consistency in its application of
the reasoning of Marsh to different and less sovereign activities.
In Evans v. Newton 94 the Court decided that the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment applied to the racially exclusive administration of a park by private trustees. The park had
been created in a testamentary trust by Senator Bacon for the
use of white people only. In explaining why the fourteenth
amendment's prohibitions applied to the park, the Court relied
in part on the fact that the City of Macon was involved in the
maintenance of the park,95 and alternately upon a designation of
the park's operation as a public function. 96 The Court reasoned
that the predominant character and purpose of the park was
municipal, but nevertheless declined to base its decision solely
on a public function analysis.
When the Court subsequently applied and relied solely
upon the public function rationale of Marsh in dealing with two
cases involving large shopping centers, 97 contradictory decisions
resulted.98 The Court realized that a new device existed by
which certain private activities could be constitutionally regulated, but there was little agreement as to the extent or method
for application of the public function doctrine. 99
The third stage of development and crystalization of the
public function doctrine occured in Jackson v. Metropolitan
1°°
Edison Co..
In Jackson, a privately owned utility company
had, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, summarily terminated the
electrical service of Catherine Jackson for nonpayment of her
electric bills. Ms. Jackson brought a section 1983 action alleging
that Edison was performing a public function and that her rights
to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment had
been violated. The Court did not reach the due process question
because it determined that the furnishing of utility services was
94. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
95. Id. at 301. "So far as this record shows, there has been no change in
municipal maintenance and concern over this facility."
96. Id. at 301. 'The service rendered even by a private park of this character is municipal in nature."
97. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Food Employees Local 590

v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
98. In Logan, the Court had relied upon the rationale of Marsh in holding that a large shopping center was the equivalent of a municipal corporation. In Lloyd, the Court held that a shopping center, larger and
significantly more independent than that in Logan, was not the equivalent
of a municipality. In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), Justice Stewart

writing for the majority, acknowledged that Lloyd had impliedly overruled
Logan despite the fact that Lloyd had distinguished Logan. Justice Stevens had dissented in Lloyd.
99. See note 98 supra.
100. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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neither a state function nor a municipal duty, and therefore was
not subject to the restraints of the fourteenth amendment. 10 1
The Jackson Court surveyed past Supreme Court decisions l 0 2 in which state action had been found on public function
grounds, and determined that these cases had all involved the
exercise, by a private entity, "ofpowers traditionallyexclusively
reserved to the State.'10 3 In using this standard, the Court relied
heavily on an historicalinquiry into the nature of utility services at common law. Citing two Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions, l ° 4 the Court stated that "[tihe Pennsylvania courts
have rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or a municipal duty."'1 ° 5 The Jackson Court therefore ruled that the Metropolitan Edison Co. was
not performing a public function and affirmed the dismissal of
06
Ms. Jackson's claim by the Third Circuit.
The Court in Jackson solidified the public function doctrine
by surveying its past decisions and deriving a standard by which
private activities were to be judged. The Jackson Court made it
clear that in examining a challenged activity under the public
function doctrine, an historical analysis should be used in determining whether a power exercised by a private entity was one
and therefore
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State"
10 7
subject to fourteenth amendment restraint.
The Flagg Court's Interpretationof the
Public Function Doctrine
In ruling that Flagg Brothers' proposed prejudgment sale of
Ms. Brooks' possessions would not constitute state action under
the public function doctrine, the Court focused solely on the
"exclusively" portion of the Jackson formula and specifically eschewed an historical analysis of the challenged activity. 10 8 The
101. Id.
102. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (municipal park); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (company town); and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (election)
were the cases cited by the Jackson Court. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority in Flagg,distinguished Evans as resting upon a finding of ordinary state action rather than the public function doctrine.
103. 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (emphasis added).
104. Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 A. 494 (1898); Girard
Life Ins. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879).
105. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
106. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973).

107. 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
108. 436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978). The dissenters would have placed the emphasis on the word "traditional". Id. at 167-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson).
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Flagg Court explained its analytical approach by stating that
"rel[iance] upon the historical antecedents of a particular practice would result in the constitutional condemnation in one
State of a remedy found perfectly permissible in another." 10 9 In
support of this proposition the Flagg Court cited two apparently
contradictory circuit court decisions on the constitutionality of
section 7-210.110 In each of these cases the circuit courts had
based their decisions on an historical analysis of warehousemen's remedies. However, the nature of the respective inquiries
differed.
In one of the cases,'
the Ninth Circuit looked to long
standing state statutes which had allowed the private foreclosure of a warehouseman's lien, while in the other," 2 the Eighth
Circuit based its decision upon an assessment of a warehouseman's rights under the common law. The two circuits' decisions
were contradictory but their historical references differed as
well. Because of these varying analyses, the Flagg Court's citation of these cases for the proposition that ambiguity must result if "historical antecedents" were relied upon, seems
113
suspect.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,1 14 the Court had relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of the
common law in holding that the furnishing of utility services
was neither a state function nor a municipal duty." 5 A similar
analysis of a warehouseman's rights at the common law by the
Flagg Coart would have removed any possibility of the ambiguity that the Court apparently feared.
It seems clear that at common law, although a warehouseman acquired a possessory lien upon the goods being stored
109. 436 U.S. 149, 162-63 (1978).
110. Cox Bakeries of N.D. v. Timm Moving & Storage, 554 F.2d 356 (8th
Cir. 1977) (action under § 7-210 held to be state action); Melara v. Kennedy,

541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976) (action under § 7-210 held not to be state action).
111. Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1976). The Melara

court downplayed the fact that a warehouseman could not sell encumbered
goods to satisfy a lien at common law. The forerunner of CAL. COM. CODE
§ 7-210 (West 1964) was 1851 Cal. Stats., ch. 12, 170 enacted in 1851, authorizing public sale by a warehouseman of encumbered goods upon which three
months storage was due.
112. Cox Bakeries of N.D. v. Timm Moving & Storage, 554 F.2d 356 (8th

Cir. 1977). The Cox court relied upon the Second Circuit's decision in
Flagg and attempted to distinguish Melara as resting upon an analysis of

long standing state statutes. The Cox court looked to the common law in
deciding the state action question. Id. at 359.
113. See note 109 supra.
114. 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
115. See notes 104 and 105 supra.
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with him, he could not sell the goods to satisfy the debt.1 6 A
warehouseman had to first go into court and obtain a judgment
against his debtor by proving not only his lien claim, but also the
amount of the charges. 117 If the debtor refused to pay the judgment, the warehouseman was required to obtain a writ of execution and deliver it to the sheriff, who would then sell the
goods. 118
By enacting section 7-210, New York effectively delegated to
Flagg Brothers the traditional roles of judge, jury and sheriff
without providing for any judicial supervision or other safeguards. Surely it cannot be sensibly contended that the statutorily authorized exercise of the authority embodied in these
offices does not constitute "the exercise ... of powers tradition119
ally exclusively reserved to the State."
In lieu of an historical analysis, and the result such an analysis would seem to require, the Flagg Court focused solely on
the "exclusively" portion of the Jackson formula. 20 In determining that the settlement of debtor-creditor disputes was not a
function exclusively reserved to the state, the Flagg Court
found it to be decisive that alternate means of relief had been
available to Ms. Brooks. 121 The alternate remedies cited by the
Flagg Court as being available to respondent in New York were
116. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 13.1 and 14.1 (3d ed.
1975).
117. Id. See generally Patton, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and
Other Documents of Title: A Comparison of the Texas Law and Article
Seven of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEx. L. REv. 321 (1954).
118. Id. See also Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300
N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973), "execution of a lien, be it a conventional
security interest ... writ of attachment ... or a judgement lien ... traditionally has been the function of the Sheriff." 33 N.Y.2d at 17, 300 N.E.2d at
713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
119. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 419.U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
120. 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). "While many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to
the State'." Id. (citing Jackson).
121. 436 U.S. 149, 159-63 (1978). In support of its reasoning the Court cited

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), a Texas white primary case, and Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). While it is true that the elections involved
in Terry had been the only meaningful ones held in the state and the streets
of the company owned town in Marsh had been the only ones available for
the purpose of exercising first amendment rights, the respective Courts in
Terry and Marsh had not considered it to be decisive that alternate forums
for the exercise of these rights had not been available to the claimants and
did not make their decisions on this basis. Rather, the Courts looked to the
fundamental purposes of the amendments relied upon and reasoned that
these purposes should not be frustrated by the fact that private persons
rather than state officials were responsible for the questioned practices.
The Flagg Court seemingly misconstrued the basis for the decisions of
these Courts.
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replevin 122 and an action for damages under subsection nine of
the challenged statute. 123 However, these remedies appeared to
be of little help. 124 Replevin was available only if respondent's
goods had been wrongfully taken, 125 and clearly New York's enactment of section 7-210 sanctioned Flagg Brothers' actions. In
order to maintain an action for damages under section 7-210(9),
Ms. Brooks would have had to prove a violation of the provisions
of the challenged statute. However, Flagg Brothers' conduct had
been in conformity with section 7-210. Even accepting the Flagg
Court's proposition that available alternative relief obviates the
exclusivity necessary for an activity to be considered a public
function, it is difficult to see how any such relief was available to
Ms. Brooks.
By holding that the existence of such alternative remedies
precludes labeling an execution sale under section 7-210 a public
function, the Court introduced a new criterion for, and seriously
restricted the scope of, this doctrine. It is difficult to imagine a
situation wherein one could not obtain alternate relief equally
as meaningful as that which the Court found available in Flagg.
The Court moreover intimated that in order to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must allege that
state law bars other relief.' 26 Under the Flagg Court's standards, the burden of proving this allegation will certainly weigh
heavily upon future claimants.
The PracticalEffect of the Flagg Court's Decision
Although the Flagg Court's application of the public function rationale is suspect, its decision reflects a practical awareness of the needs of both debtors and creditors. Any restriction
of creditor remedies would be likely to curtail the availability of
U.S. 149, 160 (1978). See McKINNEY's FORMS CPLR, § 10:337.
123. 436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978). U.C.C. § 7-210(9) provides:
The warehouseman is liable for damages caused by failure to comply
with the requirements for sale under this section and in case of willful
violation is liable for conversion.
122. 436

The Court also suggested that Ms. Brooks could have sought "a waiver of
Flagg Brothers' right to sell her goods at the time she authorized their stor-

age." 436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978). The Court stated, "Respondent Brooks has
never alleged that state law barred her from seeking a waiver of Flagg
Brothers' right to sell her goods at the time she authorized their storage."
Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, such action would have affected only
the terms of the storage contract and could not be said to have provided a

remedy, unless one adheres to the "ounce of prevention.
124. 436 U.S. 149, 167 (1978) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
125. See note 113 supra.

.

."maxim.

126. 436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978) ("Respondent Brooks has never alleged that

state law barred her from seeking a waiver of Flagg Brothers' right to sell
her goods at the time she authorized their storage") (emphasis added).
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credit to those considered marginal risks, while at the same time
increasing the cost of such credit to the borrower. 127 The Court
perhaps felt that the economic ramifications of a decision
favorable to Ms. Brooks were sufficient to override her constitutional right to procedural due process.
By deciding Flagg as it did, the Court signified that it is
comfortable with the position debtor-creditor dispute resolution
presently occupies. It is doubtful that future due process challenges of statutory summary creditor remedies will meet with
much success unless the challenged statute officially involves
the state in the questioned practice. For this reason, states may
view the Flagg decision as a vehicle for reducing the congestion
in their courts by delegating further summary remedies to creditors. At some time the Supreme Court will be called upon to
decide at what point the constitutional right to due process outweighs practical economic considerations.
CONCLUSION

In Flagg,the Court outlined a new test in determining that
New York's delegation of authority had not constituted a public
function. Before private action will be termed a public function,
a state must delegate a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to itself, and by so doing remove all remedies from those
persons affected. 128 In Flagg, the second part of this test was
not satisfied and the Court therefore concluded that New York
had not delegated a public function by enacting section 7-210.
A more equitable and farsighted decision could have been
reached by holding section 7-210 unconstitutional on due process grounds. Although notice is required by section 7-210, the
statute fails to provide the owner with a hearing before his
129
goods are sold in satisfaction of the warehouseman's lien.
The requirement that section 7-210 provide for an informal arbitration hearing in order to pass constitutional muster would
have served to protect the owner's property interests while at
the same time allowing the continued expedition of business
transactions.
As we have progressed through the twentieth century, the
127. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 478-86 (1968). But see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 91 n.37 (1972) ("[Wlith the exception

of automobiles and other major durables, the low value of the repossessed
goods combined with the low default rate of consumer debtors make the
value of repossession an insigniflcant factor in the consumer credit industry").
128. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978).
129. See note 40 supra.
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line between state and private action has become less distinct.
Our relations with the private sector have come to affect our
rights and lives to at least the extent of our involvement with
local government. To continue to recognize a distinction between state and private action where none practically exists,
frustrates the manifest concerns of the due process clause.
William R. Black

